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Abstract 
This paper aims to explore the role of the Syrian civil society in the ongoing 
conflict from the concept of transitional justice. Broadening the civil society 
understanding provides a tool to approach the overlooked social capital in the 
Syrian society. Exploring the approach from non-profit groups to victims, I aim to 
understand a possible approach to transitional justice in Syria. I argue for the 
importance of an open approach when addressing civil mechanisms and social 
capital in Syria. Especially groups considered “uncivil” have to be included in the 
civil society. Focusing on civil society provides knowledge about resources in the 
Syrian society, both in the present time of conflict, but also for a possible 
transition towards peace. This thesis elaborates that a Syrian bottom-up approach 
supports the idea of an “Arab” transitional justice clinching with liberal 
democracy, especially when the state-frame is debated. Regional differences 
regarding rule is part of the problem. When aiming for liberal democracy other 
forms of democracy and rule in general are excluded beforehand and thereby 
determining new groups –and some of the same, as “uncivil”. 
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  2 
1 Introduction 
 
“What exactly is meant by “better” or “justice” is up to us, the Syrian people, to define and 
that is why it is so important for as many people as possible to involve themselves in and 
influence this process”1 –Centre for Civil Society in Syria (CCSDS) 
 
When approaching the conflict in Syria the focus is often on wide range of actors or the effect 
of the civil war on the civil society, which has lead to mass migration. Over the past five years 
of the conflict, the focus has changed. For the first year sympathy was with the Syrian 
people´s fight against the al-Assad regime. The Syrians express a narrative of being forgotten 
in the large-scale conflict. In the West the focus has, for the past year, been fixated on the 
Islamic State and the foreign fighters travelling to join the conflict. They have become known 
for their brutality – a term which has become synonymous for Islamic State in the west. 
Daesh, as they are also called2 is known for its proto-state in a self-declared caliphate located 
on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border.3 
It is now generally understood that the Syrian conflict is snowballing into an intractable 
conflict. It seems that the road to peace has been forgotten.  
 
The inspiration to write this paper came from when I met the Syrian non-profit organisation, 
Dawlaty (Arabic for ‘my state’), in Lebanon. The group works with transitional justice. 
Transitional justice is now the common approach to post-conflict society according to Clara 
Sandoval.4 Transitional justice as a term covers both a theory and a practice and is about 
incorporating reconciliation and justice in post conflict societies. It is linked with the aim of 
liberal peacebuilding and democracy. Sandoval states that transitional justice has become the 
language of social change.5 
Centre for Civil Society in Syria (CCSDS) provided material reflecting the same 
methodology. It triggered a curiosity about bottom-up approaches to peace in a society in 
conflict. Civil society is emphasised with great importance in transitional societies working 
towards peace.  
 
The CCSDS was founded on December 1st 2011 by Syrian activists located in Turkey and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Alabdallah et al, 2014, 15 
2Arabic akronym: ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fil-Irāq qash-Shām aka The Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant 
3 Barret, 2014 pp1, Andersen, 2014, 5 
4 Sandoval, 2014, pp181 
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inside Syria, and defines itself as an “independent and non-profit Syrian Center”.6 It is 
unclear how big the organisation is, but their report “Transitional Justice in Syria: Report” 
refers to it being conducted through training of personnel from their three offices inside Syria, 
in Qameshli, Aleppo and Idlib.7 
Dawlaty started by focusing on art and non-violent resistance in 2012.8 As funding came, the 
project grew and started focusing on spreading awareness on transitional justice and 
democracy.9 They are established as a non-profit organisation in Lebanon with headquarters 
in Beirut. The office occupies around seven people, who collaborate with their team of ten 
people in the north of Syria.10  
The other part of the group is inside Syria. The project of recruiting started in the north in 
Aleppo and Idlib, focusing on how to do focus groups, questionnaires and provide 
information.  What they define as phase one was aimed at focus groups and questionnaires, 
and the information archived was analysed and shared among other groups with a similar 
focus.11  Transitional justice focuses on the need for an active civil society. Understanding 
who this is in a Syrian context, characterised by the ongoing conflict, can provide information 
on times to come. But a further strength is that it goes beyond the scope of the international 
top-down approach12 and elaborates on the Syrian social resources. 
1.1.1 Purpose of study and research questions 
The conflict in Syria goes beyond the scope of classic realist paradigm of conflict, and instead 
fits the patterns presented with the post Cold War era defined by new threats such as 
transnational terrorism, border-crossing criminal networks, and shadow economies13. A lot of 
attention has been put towards the element of transnational terrorism.14  But somewhere along 
the way it seems that the road to peace was forgotten.  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to research on civil society working in conflict, by 
looking at the use of the concept of transitional justice in a Syrian context. Further, the study 
has the purpose of contributing to a bottom-up understanding of transitional justice and the 
challenges of having liberal democracy as an end goal. Thus I intend to answer the following 
question: 
 
• Why is the civil society’s role in the ongoing Syrian conflict important and what can 
we learn from it, using the concept of transitional justice? 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 ibid 
6 http://ccsdsyria.org/category/our-team  
7Alabdallah et al, 2014, 39 
8 Jara 
9 ibid 
10 Jara 
11 Ava 
12  Sandoval, 2014, pp.180 
13 Kaldor 2012, pp105 
14 Kumelovs, 2015, Soufan, 2014, Andersen 2014 
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2 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework is built around transitional justice, the peace understanding and 
civil society presented in the following sections. I have chosen these elements because I find 
them relevant as a frame for the analysis. Civil Society will serves as a gathering theme for 
the theory and analysis. 
2.1 Previous research 
Transitional justice is increasingly becoming the respond to term in post conflict settings 
despite this still being a relative new field dating only a few decades back.15   
The term covers both the study and practice of establishing justice after atrocity.  
The theory of transitional justice is somewhat like a toolbox, ranging from rule of law, 
criminal justice, truth commission, amnesty, international courts, local-level trails, victim 
compensation and reconciliation16. There is little writing on what this means in an ongoing 
conflict. In the case of Afghanistan, transitional justice has represented a new model of 
implementation while in war and affected by insecurity and violence.17 The implementation 
was an effort from external actors. Author Elham Atashi concludes that transitional justice is 
“interconnected to perceptions of security and stability”.18  It echoes two of the major 
debates: who to reconcile and who the justice is for. A debate among scholars is “truth versus 
justice” originating from the paradigm of reconciliation and retributive justice.19 The frame 
for this debate stems from the almost simultaneous creation of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Committees and the establishment of International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY).20 
 
In her Master Thesis Ida Harriet Rump refers to a tradition of European academia, which in 
her view belongs to the Orientalist tradition when approaching Syria.21  Hereby is also 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
15 Sandoval 2014, 182 
16 Kersten 2012 
17 Atashi, 2013, pp1060 
18 ibid, 1060 
19 Thomson 2013, Sandoval, 2014, Kersten 2012, Atashi, 2013 
20 Fischer, 2007, 401 
21 Rump, 2014, 1 
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understood a stagnant understanding of the region, where the bottom-up approach has been 
ignored in a Middle Eastern context.22 
This paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of bottom-up and the potential of civil 
society in the region. Kirsten Fisher started elaborating on an “Arab” transitional justice and 
states, that even though it might be too early “to make any definitive claims about the effect 
Arab Spring transitions will have on the field of transitional justice. However, it is not 
necessarily too early to expose some of the unique features and challenges of this regional 
transition and perhaps even to speculate about, what some of the implications might be.”23 
2.1.1 Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice has become the key respond to post-conflict societies and the field 
“emerged out of attempts to give theoretical meaning to ad-hoc accountability policies 
adopted as part of a broader process of political democratisation in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe.”24 The meaning of reconciliation is under-theorized and is mostly practice 
oriented.25  
Transitional justice is interlinked with liberal peace and democracy practice.26 According to 
author Oliver Richmond, “[t]he liberal peace´s attempt to connect security, institutions, 
justice, development and civil society has been challenged as insufficient, inconsistent and 
weak, particular by its subjects”27. The failure of implementing liberal peace has often led to 
blaming locals for the lack of success.28 The liberal peace seeks to connect with civil 
society.29 Richmond also states, that the increased connection between peacebuilding and 
state-building with neoliberalism and liberal institutions overlooks aspects such as 
reconciliation.30 
The peacebuilding communities value the importance of dynamic and stable civil societies to 
obtain peace in post-conflict societies.31 
 
Part of the explanation can perhaps be found in Richmonds claim that the cry of 
“international” in peacebuilding also reflects a lack of understanding of local-level dynamics 
and a fear of essentializing. Here, international intellectual tensions, material and 
methodological limitations, and a theoretical narrowness along with a “universal” 
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28 ibid, pp66 
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understanding rooted in a limited Western experience, is the cause of this lack of 
understanding.32 
Here Fisher highlights, “Transitions in Arab Spring countries might also invite new thinking 
about the goals of transitional justice processes: Addressing legacies of past human rights 
abuses and ushering in liberal democracy.”33 Fisher states that the Arab transitional justice 
can clinch with the ultimate goal of liberal democracy.  Fisher’s work evolves around mostly 
post-conflict societies and implementation from top-down approaches. Exploring a society in 
conflict and a bottom-up approach can help to address the generalness.  
Often, when focusing transitional justice, there is a talk of restoration versus retribution. 
Retribution is linked to rule of law and reflects the moral need of prosecuting perpetrators.34  
Restorative justice focuses on reconciliation and rebuilding trust. ““reparations are best 
conceptualized as rights-based political projects aimed at giving victims due recognition and 
at enhancing civic trust both among citizens and between citizens and state institutions””.35 
The driving mechanisms are the assumption of empowering victims and perpetrators, and 
both are seen as stakeholders and key to truth.36 It covers a wide spectrum, and due to limited 
space this paper will focus on the reconciliation aspect. I have chosen this because of its 
interconnectedness with the civil society. I believe a study of Syrian civil society groups 
provides an understanding of social resources.  
 
2.1.1 Understanding peace 
Despite peace being on everybody’s lips it is unclear what is meant. For this section I 
elaborate on some of the dilemmas. Homi Bhabha states: “[...] peace itself is radically 
reconceptualised, not necessarily as an objective but as a method and process, and never a 
final end state”.37 The latter relates to the difficulties of measuring when a peace process has 
ended. At the same time, peace is the goal for post-conflict societies, but often it is not 
specified, what is meant by peace. The aspiration of peace is often described through war and 
violence and peace is often defined by negative peace, meaning the absence of direct 
violence.38 A positive peace demands overcoming structural and cultural violence and 
includes an economic, social and political justice.39 Due to the subject of working towards 
transitional justice the connection between justice and peace is important. Yet very little 
research has been done concerning this.40  Debating the connection between justice and peace 
has lead to a lively debate about trade-off between the two in contemporary peace process. 
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37 Ramsbotham et al, 2011, 407 
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The understanding of just peace is depending on ontology and epistemological standpoints. 
One approach to determining just peace as an outcome has on a large scale been dependent on 
determining the underlying major causes, and addressing the underlying causes is by some 
perceived as an attempt to resolve injustice.41 The international society is criticised for a 
generalised or “universalist” approach to peace and peacebuilding and by post-structuralist 
critiqued for “universalising” assumptions of reality and truth.42 The critique has lead to 
attempts to redefinition. One attempt is Homi Bhabha´s hybridity, that attempts to leave the 
universal peace and incorporating “diversified and fragmented peaces”.43 
2.1.2 Civil Society 
 
What is a civil society? Even in coherent strong democracies “civil society is a vague and 
general concept [...]”44 Despite “civil society” being widely debated, there is no agreed 
definition of the term. Yet the concept of civil society has always been linked with 
minimising violence.  
 
Civil society has a long tradition. According to author Mary Kaldor, Kant, Marx and Hegel 
developed the foundation for some the most generally accepted understandings of civil 
society.45 A theoretical differential understanding is between Immanuel Kants understanding 
of the civil society as universal seeking a cosmopolitan rule, where Marx and Hegel 
connected to civil society as the ethical arena between state and family.46 The latter 
understanding was the first that saw the civil society as opposition to the state and linked it to 
a historically produced phenomenon interlinking with capitalisms emergence. Hegels 
definition saw the civil society as a part of a middleclass sphere. Civil society represented the 
achievement of the modern world “[...] the territory of mediation where there is free play for 
every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where the waves of 
passion gush forth, regulated only by reason, glinting through them”.47 The contemporary 
usage tends to refer to association, NGO, social movements and the general non-profit 
sector.48 The search for a definition in classical text has provided a legitimized body of 
understanding, but also weakened the process of reinventing the term.49  
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47 Kaldor quoting Hegel, 2003, 19 
48ibid, 21 
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I have chosen to focus on Kaldors “Global Civil Society: An Answer to War” to 
conceptualise civil society. In my opinion it provides a tool to elaborate on the term both in 
and out of conflict and as a transnational operator. 
The argument is that Civil society was re-invented and the “new” civil society since 1989 was 
globalized and is no longer bound by borders. Contemporary definitions of civil society all 
have a normative aspect in terms of goals. Kaldor states that the civil society understanding is 
so wide, that it allows for selectivity. The reinterpretation of civil society means globalized. It 
is in contrast to the previous national management of society with emancipatory goals.50  
Kaldor explores five definitions of civil society. For this paper I have chosen to focus on four: 
The activist, the neo-liberal, the post-modern, and Kaldors “new” civil society. I will only 
elaborate on key elements. 
 
The activist  
The activist understanding presupposes a state, demands active citizenship and a 
redistribution of power. The understanding allows for the transnational level to be understood 
as a global space for non-instrumental communication. The activist version is about 
empowerment of individuals and extending democracy.51 
 
The neoliberal 
This understanding emerges in the post-cold war with a neoliberal population of the term as a 
voluntary “third sector” between state and market. The function is to regulate the state, but it 
also substitutes state functions. The understanding relates to a western perception, but it also 
overlaps to the world of NGOs as providing the services states cannot.52 
 
The postmodern 
The definition deviates from the universalist understanding, except for the need for tolerance. 
Here the emphasis is on pluralism and the possibility of dispute, creating an arena that is a 
source for “civility” as well as “uncivility.” It is here debated if the concept of civil society is 
Euro-centric and a product of specific Western culture that is imposed on the rest of the world 
or if a reinterpretation is necessary to broaden in a more communitarian understanding, that 
incorporates for example Islamic society. The postmodern version is thereby a more 
nationalist perception while also incorporating a plurality.53  
 
When it comes to war and the civil society, this is understood as a condition of civil society. 
The “new wars” have emphasised the key role of the diaspora groups. Violence is aimed at 
civil society, and human rights violations are a methodology of war. War itself is a form of 
political mobilisation.54 Roberto Belloni points to the fact that even the most war-torn and 
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divided societies maintain pluralistic civic constituencies that recognize the importance of 
respecting human rights.55 
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3 Methodology 
To answer the question “Why is the civil society’s role in the ongoing Syrian conflict 
important and what can we learn from it, using the concept of transitional justice?”, this paper 
is theory consuming. Meeting Dawlaty influences the ground for this paper but interviews are 
not a primary source. They are included along with other material.  
The key role of civil societies in conflict transformation societies makes an analysis of them 
in the Syrian conflict highly relevant. Transitional justice is often debated from a point of 
justice versus truth. For this paper I have chosen to focus on reconciliation operationalized 
through examining the non-profit groups of Dawlaty and CCSDS approached with a focus on 
determining victims. It will reflect the truth versus justice dilemma.  
The choice of case study is due to its strength of explaining a contemporary issue. I 
understand the case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence is 
used”56 It allows for a “thorough analysis of the complex and particularistic nature of a 
distinct phenomena”57. The case study has lead to a mix of material including interviews and 
statistical data provided by the groups. The interviews were conducted through qualitative 
research aiming to provide an in-depth understanding58 and are elaborated further below. The 
qualitative method is reflected in the paper and I believe that the combination is a strength in 
explaining why59  the civil society is important to understand.  
I have kept in mind the knowledge-claims of research and science since anthropology, 
ethnography and the field of Middle Eastern studies all have roots in colonialism.60 This is 
highly relevant when working with transitional justice in a Middle Eastern country like Syria. 
Instead of focusing on all that was left out, this paper will hopefully serve as a small 
contribution to exploring the civil society in times of conflict. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
56 Soy, 1997, referencing Robert Yin 
57 ibid 
58 Teorell, Svensson, 2013, 10 
59 ibid, pp 265 
60 Rump, 2014 
  11 
3.1.1 Material  
The data collection consists of two parts; one will focus on secondary literature and is 
collected of academic and journalistic literature providing the frame for the historical 
background for the conflict and for the civil society. It will also provide the theoretical 
material for an analytical framework around the main concept of civil society, peace and 
transitional justice. 
The other data collection contains reports, interviews and journalistic material, providing the 
material for analysing the ongoing phenomenon. 
 
Due to the limited space the main focus of this paper will be on CCSDS and Dawlaty. It is 
unknown whether these groups collaborate. Where Dawlaty’s approach and survey material is 
not accessible due to language barrier, CCSDS material was available in English.  
The material of CCSDS’s report is based on a large survey conducted in Syria 2012-2013 and 
an introduction to transitional justice. It is unclear what language the CCSDS survey is 
conducted. The framing of the questions are closed, but again these questionnaires were filled 
out after hour-long meetings with the triple role of collecting information, educating and 
discussing transitional justice and practising “democracy on the ground”61. Both groups have 
the triple approach of providing information, conducting surveys and analysing information. 
Dawlaty’s material is published in 2013, it is unclear if the translation is published the same 
year. There are no official names and I will refer to the written material as Dawlaty, 2013. 
The main problem with CCSDS and Dawlaty’s material is that it is a few years old and 
strictly focusing on the regime. It doesn’t address the highly complicated conflict of present 
time Syria. A source of error on my part could be assuming that it would be different now. 
3.1.1 Interview 
For this section I will elaborate on the conducted interviews. The narrow focus on the subject 
made interviewing a chosen methodology. The aim was to reflect realities and challenges and 
avoid a shallow understanding. The interview with Dawlaty provided a background-
knowledge and will be referred in the paper. It was agreed prior to the meeting, that the 
interview was not to be published. This influences the intersubjectivity of the paper, although 
it is common practice not to include. This paper focuses on bottom-up and reflects a micro-
level process and therefore the voices of the people, who work with this need to be heard.62  
Four interviews with different people were conducted in Lebanon in week 16, April 2015. 
Contact was established through a gatekeeper63 or my own private contacts. The interview 
was conducted in English, not the first language for any of us. When the interview with 
Dawlaty was conducted, the primary focus was on Lebanon and not Syria. Due to the 
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interview now serving another aim, I have chosen not to include the name of the interviewed, 
despite having agreed on this in a previous phase. The group has been informed of the 
changes. I will refer to the interviewed from Dawlaty as Ava and Jara. Yar refers to another 
interview with a former volunteer for Red Crescent Syria now living in Lebanon. 
I am aware of their name and identity and the odd ethical decision to anonymise when 
permission was obtained. The reason for not including their names relates to this having been 
a wish in other interviews like the one with Yar. Either because of fear of the Lebanese state 
or because the interviewed still had relatives inside Syria.64 
 
The meeting took place in their Lebanese office with their operation manager and 
administrator.65 The questions were sent beforehand on their request and consisted of open-
ended questions providing a frame for a semi-structured interview.66  The questions were 
influenced by informal conversations upon arrival. The aim was to keep the interview as open 
as possible, gaining detailed answers and their input.67 At the same time the overall frame was 
to divide the interview in two. The first part was structured around conditions for a Syrian 
NGO working in Lebanon, and the second part about their work, approach and understanding 
of transitional justice and thereby a mix of facts and subjective perception68. The structure and 
the fact that the original purpose of the interview being mainly on the conditions in Lebanon 
has highly influenced the information achieved and especially what was not. Interviewing 
does obtain a strong relationship to power-balance. The power dynamic in interviewing 
reflects the power-knowledge and has to be elaborated to avoid a positivistic understanding of 
knowledge as immune to the workings of power.69 The fact that the interviewed were 
motivated to tell their story contributed to a constructive conversation. But it also creates a 
difficulty in becoming the “voice” of a small non-profit group with its own interests. 
There is a power dynamic when approaching conflict issues and interviewing with people 
displaced by conflict. Often one can be a representative of European heritage and thereby not 
fully capable of grasping the situation they are in.70 When talking to Ava and Jara they made 
an effort to make the situation comfortable.  
 
For this paper I have chosen to mainly use the Arabic acronym Daesh 71 and not Islamic 
State because this was the terminology used during interviews. 
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3.1 Reflections 
When I started approaching the field of bottom-up to transitional justice from non-profit 
Syrian groups, I found a gap between the academic field and practice. Where this was 
unrepresented in academia, there was a blossom of groups working within the frame of 
transitional justice.72 This clearly reflects the norm that transitional justice now represents in 
peacebuilding. Why transitional justice is so well represented could also reflect the fact that 
Syrian NGO´s have been struggling for resources73, and transitional justice is a way to get 
funding. It is unclear whom Dawlaty collaborates with internationally, and receives their 
funding from, besides No Peace Without Justice and Heinrich Böll Stiftung: Middle East. I 
did not ask about this during the interview, and the fact that most of their material is in Arabic 
makes this a possible source of error on my part. The CCSDS report on transitional justice, 
thanks contributors and supporters who include United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Democracy Council, The 
US-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).74 In a lecture in Copenhagen University, 
professor Reinoud Leenders presented his working paper on “the Politics of Humanitarianism 
and the War in Syria”, where he talked about the role of humanitarianism and aid, making 
humanitarian actors sovereign in the fragile Lebanese state.75 This states that aid is not 
neutral, it is rather highly complicated as also debated in Michael Barnett “a History of 
Humanitarianism: A History of Humanitarianism”76 It can therefore serve as a question if the 
attention to the subject reflects a genuine belief or transitional justice as a “buzzword” for aid. 
This merely reflects my concerns.  
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4 Case study 
Having elaborated on theory and methodology this section introduces Dawlaty’s and 
CCSDS’s work with transitional justice. Firstly follows a background on the context for the 
present time Syrian conflict society. Thereafter follows a section defining the Syrian civil 
society.  
To address the transnational aspect of the civil groups I will use Dawlaty and Lebanon to 
elaborate on the conditions of working away from home. I have chosen to elaborate 
reconciliation in a Syrian context through an analysis of CCSDS’s survey material. Here I 
focus on victim as a key variable in determining a transitional approach. 
4.1.1 Background  
Syria is a Middle Eastern country located in the Levant, a historical geographical term 
referring to a large area in the eastern Mediterranean. The area includes Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Israel and Palestine. It is often understood as the same area as “”Greater-Syria”.77 
Before 2011, most people probably couldn’t pin point Syria on a map. Due to the regimes 
repression of peaceful protesters, Syria has been on everybody’s lips. Now people even know 
the Levant by name. Daesh, or Islamic State in the Iraq and the Levant has put it back on the 
map. 
The modern nation-state of Syria was created as a part of the Sykes-Picot agreement 
following WW I. The Ottoman kingdom had sided with the loosing side, and was divided 
between a French and an English rule.78 
As a freshly decolonialised state, Syria underwent four state coups, 1949-1966. 1970 marked 
the last coup when defence minister Hafiz al-Assad took power. This was the beginning of the 
“Assad-dynasty”: a minority regime with members of the Alawit sect in key positions of 
power. The Assad rule has been through the officially socialist Baath party, creating a strong 
bond to the poorer rural or peripheral areas.79 How much Hafiz al-Assad and his son Bashars 
rule is comparable has been discussed. Since 2000 Bashar al-Assad has been in power. The 
change in leadership created a way for an urban middle-class and abandoning the periphery 
with the result that Human Rights Watch referred to the first ten years as a wasted decade.80  
Author Lisa Weeden states that the authoritarian rule in Syria lead the citizens to acting “as 
if”, understood as the state not incorporating its citizens and seeking legitimacy but instead 
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generating compliance.81 Understanding why this was “accepted” has to do with the stability 
the regime produced. The neighbouring Lebanese Civil War served as a reminder of the 
consequences of not living in a strong state.82 
 
Where the revolution started has been a point of debate,83 but on the 15 th of March 2011 the 
regime arrested and tortured young boys in the age 10-15 for spray-painting “the people want 
the regime to fall”[my translation] at their school.84 The regimes brutal reaction led to mass 
mobilisation. 
4.1.2 Security disparity 
Having accounted for pre-revolutionary Syria, this section focuses on the security factor in 
cross-border work and the affect of the severe security situation inside Syria. CCSDS points 
that the hardship of the situation contributed to difficulties because the need for relief made 
the immediate situation a priority over meetings. They claim the strength of their survey is 
that despite the critical situation 1000 respondents have been reached and participated.85 
CCSDS states that meetings where held in cities and in the countryside as well as in both 
regime- controlled and opposition-controlled areas. Here they point to regime-controlled areas 
as “very” difficult for security reasons, and that Islamist militants in FSA-controlled area also 
provided a “problem”.86  
Dawlaty elaborates that sometimes working underground has been a strict necessity, but also 
on their need for the “liberated ” areas to work. A part of their work now is approaching 
community leaders and determining the need in the civic society in regard to the subject, also 
in the areas where they “cant even mention democracy.”87 Therefore there is a need to find a 
way to inform these citizens. Targeting key local actors was an approach the international 
community implemented in Bosnia in the transition period to build democracy, though with 
little success.88 The idea of leaking information reflects an understanding of these areas as 
being ruled from a top-down approach and assumes an interest among at least part of the 
citizens. It also reflects a geographical challenge later on in the process because of early stage 
implementation being uneven. That the implementation is missing in the areas where 
democracy is an off topic reinforces this disparity. 
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4.1.3 Displaced civil society and difficulties 
Having elaborated on security, this section focuses on the displaced part of the group and their 
working conditions. 
A difficulty is that funders often look to fund large-scale initiatives, which international 
organisations provide better guarantee for.89 An informal conversation with a member of one 
of the biggest international NGO’s working with Syrians within Lebanon also confirmed, that 
in Lebanon, local partnerships were considered to be Lebanese90. Both of these tendencies 
point towards a possible knowledge-loss from Syrian organisations in Lebanon. Instead of 
being considered a knowledge resource, they are overlooked. A further complication is that 
Lebanese restrictions prohibit Syrians from volunteering in large scale NGO work. This is 
because NGOs cannot provide health insurance for Syrian workers. Even when working pro-
bono.91  
The Lebanese-Syrian boarder is now closed for the first time and residency permits have been 
stopped.92 In recent time Dawlaty has lost employees, who cannot renew their residency.93 
This leaves Syrians in Lebanon with a choice, staying in Lebanon illegally or leaving the 
country.  
Elaborating on the Lebanese aspect belongs in another time and place. But the relative 
stability that the exile communities do operate under, along with lack of resources makes 
Syrians rush to fill this void. “ Forged in war and facing many challenges, these fledgling 
groups see themselves as a bulwark against the further disintegration of Syrian society and 
vital to any post-conflict future.”94 The exile provides knowledge of Lebanese rights and 
could provide strength upon returning. This highlights the role of displaced civil society’s 
capacity and important role upon return. The role here is double, because it is a capacity 
building while displaced.  
4.1.4 Defining victims for restoration 
Who is a victim in Syria? Dawlaty’s surveys first focus on determining who identifies as a 
victim and if the victimizing is still going on.95   
The questioner from CCSDS asks about the timeframe of the investigations. Here the options 
are to investigate violations committed during the Syrian Revolution from 15th of March until 
today or to investigate violations perpetrated between 1960 until today.96  
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Determining the timeframe is also a part of determining victim. Expanding the timeframe to 
include the period of both al-Assad rules, would serve as a deeper reconciliation. Here 77% of 
the respondents preferred the long timeframe and 23% preferred the limited97. In the analysed 
data it showed a regional divide. 91% of the respondents from Hasaka preferred an 
investigation into the past five decades of crime, where in Idlib, this number was a lower 
52%.98 CCSDS points to the former region being a Kurdish majority area, and the survey 
might reflect the oppression towards de Kurdish minority.99 It also showed a slight majority 
of women, 80%, more than men, 76%, who preferred the long timeframe.100 Focusing the 
timeframe throughout the Baath rule could help to elaborate on the civil society during this 
period and serves a point in creating broader frame for victims. Who is allowed to be a 
victim? Healing and reconsolidating time under post-authoritarian regime is a step towards 
addressing structural violence and thereby a step towards positive peace.   
When it came to reconciliation 74% was pro establishing truth commissions.101 79% saw 
dialogue as a method of reconciliation to overcome historically rooted problems, with no 
significant difference in age, gender, religion or occupation.102 Dialogue is a wide term and 
due to dialogue-meetings being part of the methodology for the survey, it could include 
something similar. The focus on historically rooted problems does give an impression of this 
being a lager scale than just local level. 
Elaborating further on truth-commissions, 74% thought it was important, with a slight 
overweight of women, 81% to 70% men. Yet only 35% of both men and women considered 
amnesty an important issue -A slightly higher number in Kurdish provinces with 43%.103 It is 
of great relevance because amnesty is considered a tool for truth. For truth commissions to be 
effective truth most be considered a value and amnesty can therefore provide space for truth 
telling. It reflects the big debate of truth versus justice. Amnesty secures participants against 
prosecution. 
The paper also elaborates on a minority of 20% that does not wish any investigation.104 This 
minority group is important to keep in mind. Only focusing on reconciliation in periods with 
experience of direct regime violence might produce fast results. But it might also open the 
door for negotiating a negative peace, commonly negotiated in post conflict and often the 
common understanding of peace.  
The numbers presented by CCSDS does provide a base for speculating in the role of women 
in a Syrian peace context. If it follows the trend that Fisher points to in “arab” traditional 
justice, this could affect the process. Syria could include its existing resources as for instance 
to the Islamic and tribal law, the Sulha that  “[...] is a known concept for reaching 
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reconciliation and uncovering truth.”105 The law schools have different understandings, 
approaches and interpretations, and the regions and tribes have different ways of 
implementing. But according to CCSDS, what they do have in common is the first and second 
step of the Sulha, to end conflict and find a mutual agreement.106 I will elaborate further on 
recourses in the analysis. 
 
4.1.5 Planet Syria and a voice of the people 
Planet Syria is a campaign based on surveys conducted in Syria by a collaboration of groups 
asking the citizens how they thought the violence could be stopped.  Dawlaty was a part of the 
early phase of the Planet Syria campaign. Here focus is on the international community’s 
responsibility in stopping the violence. It resulted in a two-headed approach, stopping the al-
Assad regimes barrel bombs and real peace talks.107 I will not elaborate on the relatively 
modest first wish, or debate the truth versus justice aspect of negotiation.  
Instead I will point to the fact that Planet Syria serves another purpose, spreading and 
reaching the international community. “Through campaigns we aim to reach the decision 
makers throughout the word”108. The idea is, that “one thing will lead to another”, and “they 
will hear of what we do, and then they will look after, what we do...”109 There the aim of the 
bottom-up approach through social media and the internet, is to reach decision makers. At the 
same time it serves as community building aspect of uniting in a cause and creating a voice of 
the Syrian people. This methodology has a long way to climb to reach the ears of those in 
power. But for the community building aspect it might strengthen bond for the future. 
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5 Analysis 
“The will is a wilful will if one is not meant to have a will”  
-Sarah Ahmed110 
In the last section I introduced the aspect of a displaced civil society and working 
transnationally. I will now focus my analysis on civil society. This will be approached trough 
Kaldors normative definition along with Reinoud Leenders and Steven Hydemanns work on 
social mobilisation in the early risings. Leenders, Hydemann argues that a broad 
understanding of network and mobilisation is a strength. My argument follows theirs but 
aiming at this also including a broad and inclusive approach to civil society for the same 
reasons. 
Focusing on victims showed regional differences and in the analysis I will further elaborate 
on this debating the challenges of the end goal of liberal democracy. I will also apply civil 
society to enlighten the importance of an inclusive approach in this regard.  
5.1 Civil Society in conflict 
When defining civil society CCSDS states “[c]ivil society is a “third” sector, different from 
business or government.”111 Here it includes labour units, religious groups and media, where 
they are understood to “[...] serve to broaden the debate in a democratic society [...]”.112  The 
definition is pluralistic but using Kaldor’s definition, the understanding as the civil society as 
a “third sector” is a liberal understanding. As elaborated earlier I am not sure that this reflects 
the groups as liberal or rather that the liberal understanding has gained a normative role. 
CCSDS definition frames a need for organisation of some sort of inclusion in the definition. It 
echoes an understanding of civil society as something different from times of war. But these 
groups not only provide a space for articulating citizens participating in the public life. An 
important point is that these civil society groups also can engage in illegal and/or violent 
actions. When broadening the understanding, it is possible to se other dynamics in the society. 
A lot of the definition has to do with the eye of the beholder, the point being that civil society 
groups can be seen as “uncivil”.113 Defining civil and uncivil reflects rule of law. 
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Following this line of thinking, exploring the “uncivil” in a broader context provides an 
understanding for mechanisms on the edge of “civil” society. Leenders and Hydemann credit 
the social structures of Dar´a in relation to the 2011 uprisings. 
 “[...] strong clan-based or tribal social structures, circular labour migration, cross-border 
linkages and proliferating practices denoted as “criminal” variable played a key role in 
cementing these social networks. ”114 They claim, that the fact that these networks were 
misperceived was a key factor in the early uprising, giving them a strong structure but little 
attention, because they were delegitimized.115 Here, it is the combination of social 
organisation in Dar´a along with socio-geographical circumstances in the Middle East and 
North Africa, MENA-region, that affected the citizens, that created opportunity for an 
effective uprising.116 The mechanisms seem to be a mix of different civil society definitions. 
Kaldors main point of the globalised reality for the “new” civil society seems of great 
importance due to cross-border activity. But the rural or peripheral aspect is also relevant 
because this area was presumed loyal to the regime, and perceived as “marginal”, 
“backwards” or “isolated”.117 The regime therefore focused its attention on the urban areas. 
The background for the mass mobilisation was build on social networks. Here Leenders, 
Hydemann clarifies that the Dar´a clan structure is on extended family ties of kinship 
aggregated into larger confederation, and by that definition Dar´a has about seven major 
clans. “At a level of daily life and social organization, the clans provide a major source of 
solidarity, identity and socio-economic coping or survival.”118 The clans had a central role in 
mobilising and share an interconnectedness and overlap with labour migration networks, 
cross-border networks and criminal networks. “This type of social organization can also be 
argued to have thrived in direct response to and to some degree independently from 
centralized, authoritarian rule and its low tolerance for formal, collective action”119 Besides 
the cross-boarder activity, this echoes the post-modern definition of pluralism and the need to 
include the “uncivil” in the in the civil society understanding. The narrow normative 
understanding seems to have served as a great advantage, providing opportunity for social 
mobilisation. The social network aspect of the civil society is not a focus for Kaldor’s 
definitions and point towards the postmodern critique and need for reinterpreting other sorts 
of groups. 
“Common prejudice against “tribal” forms of social organization shared by some secular 
anti-regime intellectuals and activist found echoes in conceptualizations of what “modern” or 
democratic politics is about and, even more importantly, what it excludes.”120 
This quote by Leenders, Hydemann elaborates on what could be a problem for a broad 
inclusion of civil society from within the Syrian civil society. 
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 This paper opens with a quote from CCSDS that unifies the role of the people on the ground 
and the civil society groups. This definition is more an activist understanding insinuating 
bottom up and thereby also an influence on democracy. Here there is a focus on the active 
citizenship. 
 
As elaborated civil society groups are considered to be of outmost importance in conflict 
transformation. ”The main focus of civil society-building has often been local non-
governmental organisations (NGO´s) seen as capable of articulating needs of independently 
of vested political interests and involving grass-roots community ”voices””121 
-Groups like Dawlaty and CCSDS might well be recognised in a transitional society by 
international actors seeking to strengthen the civil society. 
But despite the desire for social capacity these are often misused or neglected in times of 
peacebuilding. The case of peacebuilding in post-war Bosnia showed that association with 
international affiliations created an asymmetrical influence. Further a top-down focus on civil 
society created a misconception on who was a capacity to rebuild.122 
5.1.1 State, civil society and revolution as identity maker 
Much of the literature and reports on Syria now focuses on the revolution as a key. It goes 
without saying that for understanding the present Syrian context, the revolution is a key 
and it is not surprising that the revolution conform a historical marker. But there is, in my 
opinion, also a tendency to neglect what was there before. 
Dawlaty states that after the revolution there has been a “tremendous growth(..)”123 for civil 
society.  
The traditions of non-governmental actors and volunteers in Syria can be traced back to the 
Ottoman Empire.124 In revolutionary times this understanding could also have revived in a 
search to a pre-regime time. 
Often the reports pay little attention to the history of the civil society or like Dawlaty making 
it only with three lines referencing the Baath regimes restriction, keeping civil society “[...] 
weak and under the control of the state´s security forces”.125 
Since the Baath coup in the 1960s state-funded associations for the biggest groups restricting 
and defining a civil society have influenced the civil society. As Bassam Haddad, director of 
the Middle East Studies Program at George Mason University says about the regime:  
“It did [allow civil society], but one to its liking, led by networks that worked directly or 
indirectly under the president [...] Beyond that, the space for completely independent civil 
society continued to be limited””126 
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The restriction under the regime might serve a great point, to why this is not a bigger focus. 
As civil society activist and political researcher Hassan Abbas points out, due to the regime 
being build on force, there was not the same popular base. “The regime doesn´t believe in civil 
society”127, he states. Syria can be understood as a state-nation, a top down approach to state 
building often presents in post-colonial societies.128 A top-down understanding of the state as 
opposed to a bottom-up nation does account for the role of the civil society. It reflects why a 
state would focus on acting “as if” a nation-state. If we are to focus out of state-perspective 
there are other mechanisms to account for. Wedeen focus on the role of compliance in what 
was a stable authoritarian regime in Syria prior to march 2011. The role of the Lebanese civil 
war, also served as a “[...] chilling reminder of the consequences of not living under a strong 
state.”129 The Assad regime did provide stability for the region. Syria was a regional power of 
great importance. Not focusing on civil society during the Assad period serves to delegitimize 
this restricted civil society, but it also serves to distance one selves from the role of 
compliance.  
Wedeens statement reflect Kaldors notion of the new cross-border civil society at the same 
time as it is clearly nation-bound. When talking to Dawlaty, the role of history is a subject. 
Ava talk about the role of history as a base for knowledge in Middle Eastern countries. “They 
depend on their history130” and therefor history serves as a reminder to do things differently.  
It reflects a resource. An often slightly static understanding of conflict identity does not focus 
on history as a tool for not making the same mistakes twice.  
If we are to focus on the idea of depending on their own history, it becomes even more 
interesting that groups like Dawlaty do not provide a historical reference. I believe that one 
explanation could be in the power of the revolution as an identity maker.  
 
“We keep remembering our beautiful memories about the first, when we started our 
revolution. It was amazing. For almost one year. It was the best years in our lives. Suddenly it 
is a disaster all around you. You are without country, you can’t go back. You see your friends 
going, dying, traveling [...] But we still have hope.”131 
 
Understanding the revolution as something almost out of time serves as a unifier. It unites the 
groups active in the time of the revolution. And it also serves to cut off the time of the regime. 
It is part of redefining who is now considered “uncivil”. The social movement creates a space 
for a new norm. But it is not necessarily a pluralistic understanding.  
Reading Dawlay´s material they have six pages dedicated to elaborate on post revolutionary 
civil society of relevance to transitional justice. Civil society documentation groups 
documenting alleged crimes, civil society groups working with need relief and building trust 
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to engage with vulnerable and marginalized groups, and policy seeking groups.132 Space 
keeps me from elaborating on all of this. It is highly interesting that there is this broad support 
for transitional justice at this stage in the conflict. I would argue for stretching Kaldors focus 
on displaced groups’ role in conflict and stressing the relevance of groups within the nation 
and the cross-national aspect of the civil groups.  
5.1.1 Peacebuilding resources in the traditional society 
Understanding the possibilities of reconciliating Syria greatly relates to how we understand 
the Syrian civil society. A broad and inclusive approach to civil society could benefit from 
already existing conflict resolution mechanisms present outside the state structures. CCSDS 
refers, that it is important that “local” not only is a space for intervention, but also one of 
knowledge.133 Transitional reconciliation tools, as the Sulha is an example. 
When it comes to the cultural aspect of peacebuilding, Charles Taylor focuses on a 
hermeneutic encounter as the foundation to expand the conceptual space they are in.134 This 
approach is a potential tool, but the fact that democracy is about the individual rights, and 
Shari´a law can be interpreted to protect from human interference.135 It can often lead to a 
discussion of secular versus religious freedom, where the maxim of secular freedom can be 
used as an exclusive mechanism and vice versa.136 
Further there is a gap between interest and resources. The fact that Islamic and clan Sulha 
tradition provides a local level capacity for resolution does not mean that this is a desirable 
solution. Elaborating on CCSDS civil societies definition close link to the liberal 
understanding of civil society was questioned as a possible source of error due to the 
normative role of the liberal definition. But no matter what, transitional justice is 
interconnected with a liberal peace. If liberal democracy is desired it could quite well include 
a will to take a step away from traditional measures.  On a more general note it is a challenge 
that is presumed that the people on the ground has a shared and equal interest in reconciliation 
in general.137  
5.1.2 Whos democracy? 
Having focused on civil society as a Syrian phenomenon the approach has been mostly 
national. I have argued for a more inclusive understanding of the civil society. This section 
elaborates further on the difficulties on the end goal of liberal democracy regional challenges 
to the democratic understanding. Throughout the examination of Dawlaty’s and CCSDS’s 
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material, the regime has been the primary focus with possible source of error being that their 
material was conducted before the rise of Daesh. The Syrian context is beyond complex. 
Elaborating on the victim aspect showed demographic differences where Kurdish areas were 
marked both on a higher willing-ness to amnesty and a long time-frame. The willingness to 
amnesty shows a focus on truth. It is interesting due to the truth versus justice. Especially 
considered that the Kurdish has been stripped of their Syrian nationality.138 It could reflect a 
will to reconcile a Syrian nation. But now the Kurdish “cause” is echoing in the West and this 
affirms a focus on minority rights.139 
 Rump approaches the Kurdish search for autonomy from a point of anarchist-inspired 
bottom-up approaches within the Kurdish regions and interacting with the top-down 
approaches of the PYD.140 Here the aim is to constitute radical democracy and includes an 
implicit critique of capitalism and state structures.141 The aim is far from the aim of 
transitional justice.  
A group rarely reaching western focus is the Druse minority of Syria, where I was told of 
blossoming Druse areas. It was said that some areas were closed off, the Druse religious 
leaders now refused to send any more men to war and have barricaded the area.142 It has not 
been possible to confirm, but I have chosen to include the story because it possibly reflects a 
misconception of minority support for the al-Assad regime. It points to a possible social 
capacity building within the Syrian border of the conflict. But lastly it reflects yet another 
alternative solution that could possibly interfere with the concept of transitional justice. 
Daesh’s cross-border operation is a severe problem for a future nation-building. It was 
estimated that six million people where living under their rule in October 2014.143 Besides the 
obvious security threat and lack of territorial control, the understanding of the terror-group 
might be off. Loretta Napoleoni highly contests the normative understanding of Islamic State 
as strictly a terror-regime, and focuses instead on the state-building aspect, providing an 
understanding of the group as a socially inclusive project. The aim is a modern version of the 
Caliphate but the biggest achievement of Daesh has been to fulfil the obligations of a modern 
nation-state in terms. Napolione states that a social contract between the people and the state 
is important, along with legitimacy, stability and rule of law/legal rights.144 Understanding 
Daesh as a state-building apparatus is far more difficult in terms of transitional justice because 
it is mutually exclusive and far more difficult to defeat. If Daesh is to be understood as a 
social inclusion it greatly influences the perception of victims. Though it is important to 
remember that social project and “terror-regime” is not mutually exclusive. Presumably these 
are some of the regions where democracy can’t be mentioned. If we understand Daesh as 
(also) social inclusion it also changes the top-down perception.  
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But it greatly reflects the notion of alternative societies in Syria. A trend emerging just after 
the “Arab risings” among scholars focusing on the region was that the Middle East was 
“deconstructing” itself.145 Looking at mechanisms in Syria this could be true. But it is also  
quite a quick-fix perception. What is really interesting is if transitional justice contains a 
possible self-determination for regions? Transitional justice is indefinitely linked to the 
nation-state and liberal democracy, how will it interact with alternative rules within the frame 
of a nation? It could quite well point toward Fishers statement of an “Arab” transitional 
justice clinching with the ultimate goal of liberal democracy from both lack of territorial 
sovereignty, rejection of democracy in general and rejection of the liberal democracy 
specifically.  
 
Without these bigger regional challenges, liberal democracy provides another challenge for 
the civil society. Liberal democracy would create a new group as ”uncivil”. The major 
challenge in Syria is to keep the broad and inclusive approach, and I think most importantly, 
also include the ”uncivil” in the civil society. Sara Ahmeds quote introducing the analytical 
section provides a connection between wilful and repression and serves to sum up the need 
for inclusion and the subjective understanding of actions. It reflects a notion of great 
importance for understanding civil societies and has served as an inspiration for writing this 
paper. When foreclosing on an inclusive broad approach, an outer group is created and 
thereby perceived as wilful.  
 When moving towards a liberal peacebuilding process in a conflict society the key is not to 
rephrase the definition of “civil” and “uncivil”. A major problem for the liberal democracy is 
that it would still exclude a search for radical democracy in Kurdish areas and it would 
presumably still exclude networks like in Dar´as that provided mobilising in the early risings.  
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6 Conclusion 
Setting out to answer, “Why is the civil society’s role in the ongoing Syrian conflict important 
and what can we learn from it, using the concept of transitional justice?,” I found that civil 
society has multiple functions relating to transitional justice. 
Keeping a broad approach to civil society elaborates on the many aspects and resources of the 
Syrian civil society in this ongoing conflict. The transnational aspect is strength. The case of 
Lebanon shows that a civil society is filling a gap in humanitarian relief and developing on a 
civil society in exile despite challenges from the state-apparatus. Dawlaty’s and CCSDS’s 
work each has an aspect of developing democratic resources and strengthening the civil 
society by having awareness and a democratic practise. Part of their methodology is similar to 
the post conflict methodology by the international community in Bosnia. It is unclear if this 
again reflects a norm in peacebuilding approaches. 
Addressing the findings of this paper it shows a capacity in groups working towards a 
transitional justice in times of conflict. It shows strength in a broad approach to civil society.  
Many of the dynamics reflects Kaldors definition of the “new” civil society and the 
transnational aspect. This is an important factor in both the early stages of the revolution as 
well as for the displaced groups working towards transitional justice.  
 
But it also reflects that the self-determination might echo the norm of neoliberalism. This I 
argue might reflect norm more than reality. The idea of empowerment and redistribution of 
power reflects the activist approach and makes sense considering Dawlaty’s focus on the post 
revolution civil society. But I argue that it is important to include the postmodern definition as 
well to reinterpret “civil” and “uncivil” to understand mechanisms on the “edge” or far from 
the normative western interpretation. 
I have chosen to explore from an understanding of “civil society” but as this paper reflects, 
“civil societies” had been equally relevant. The choice of singular reflects the common 
understanding along with Kaldors terminology. It also serves to highlight the complexity of 
the Syrian context and the need for inclusion. 
 
When looking at capacity for reconciliation it has to be remembered that this might not be in 
the interest of the groups who seeks a liberal democracy to reconcile through Islamic Sulha 
tradition. Further CCSDS material showed a minority not seeking an investigation to 
reconcile.  
The relevance of civil society and the ongoing conflict is enhanced due to a narrative of the 
civil society blossoming for the revolution. Therefore there is an understanding of the civil 
society connected to the onging conflict. This is interesting because it clinches with the 
normative understanding of civil society that CCSDS reflects with their definition of civil 
society. Understanding the civil society now is key for times to come. 
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Civil society in a Syrian context reflects the notion of the new civil society as a contrast to the 
managed civil society. The foundation for this movement is an activist approach, which could 
clinch later on with the idea of liberal peace, if a more active citizenship is wanted. The 
survey shows a need to reconcile in a long timeframe with regional differences. This is highly 
challenging for the liberal democracy and the nationalistic aspect of the transitional justice. 
Rump reflects that some Kurdish areas seek a more direct approach to democracy. Again this 
interacts with the activist citizenship. Further, it reflect that civil society might also have big 
regional differences. Dawlaty’s notion on civil society as repressed before the revolution is 
right on most ways, but it might not be mutually exclusive with an active civil society. It 
rather reflects the difference between ”civil” and ”uncivil”. The regional differences of safety 
and security affect how well developed the perception of civil society is. A non-inclusive 
approach could ruin the national aspect and lead to a split. 
None of Kaldors definitions incorporates the importance of social network and gives strength 
to the postmodern critique of a need for interpretation. The Syrian transitional justice might 
challenge the goal of liberal democracy and the nationalistic aspect. It might be more of a 
challenge because it forecloses on alternative forms of rule and therefore creates an outer 
group of wilful. 
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